Information Systems (IS) innovation in healthcare is a contested area often characterized by complex and conflicted relationships among different stakeholders. This paper aims to provide a systematic understanding of the mechanisms through which competing visions about health sector reforms are translated into policy and action generating contradictions in IS innovation. The paper argues that we can learn more about the source of such contradictions by examining how competing frames can affect IS innovation in healthcare.
Introduction
IS innovation in healthcare, defined as the evolution of information technology applications in the transformation of healthcare 1 , is a contested area characterized by complex and conflicted relationships among different stakeholders (Boonstra and Van Offenbeek 2010; Cho and Mathiassen 2007; Constantinides and Barrett 2006) . The contested nature of IS innovation in the health sector lies in the contradictions brought about by governments' policies and reforms of the public sector.
Various scholars have demonstrated that health sector policies and the role that they assign to IT-enabled transformations are constructed in discourse (Brown 1998; Doolin 2003; Klecun 2015; Klecun-Dabrowska and Cornford 2000) . Discourse influences how an IT system is implemented and effects healthcare transformation (Klecun 2015) . Key stakeholders re-interpret the main vision and goals of policy documents affecting how a policy is translated into action and produces impact (Mueller et al. 2004; Pope et al. 2006 ).
Controversies over IS innovations in the health sector arise when the vision and expectations set by policy-makers in health sector reforms are not shared by IS users (Klecun 2015; Morrison et al. 2013) . In this context, the purpose and meanings of an IS innovation carried in policy documents are renegotiated and interests are realigned leading to different forms of resistance and work-arounds (Cho et al. 2008; Doolin 2004; Payne and Leiter 2013; Wainwright and Waring 2007) .
In addition, policy-makers themselves often lack a common vision of how IT should transform the health sector (Klecun-Dabrowska and Cornford 2000; Morrison et al. 2013) .
For example, some may view cost-savings from the reduction of hospital admissions as the main aim of remotely monitoring patients through telehealth. Others may envisage the adoption of telehealth for the provision of enhanced community services putting more emphasis on better care to patients (Klecun-Dabrowska and Cornford 2000) .
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Existing research acknowledges that the lack of a common vision in health sector policies can lead to contradictions in the implementations and impact of IS innovations (KlecunDabrowska and Cornford 2000; Morrison et al. 2013) . Such contradictions manifest in the different purposes an IS is used for, which, eventually, may generate conflicting organizational outcomes, such as, increased spending on patient-centered care as opposed to efficiency gains. Yet, there is little understanding of how competing visions about health sector reforms translate into policy and action generating contradictions in IS innovation.
In this paper, we draw on frame theory and rhetorical strategy analysis to better understand how actors shape and communicate their policy and vision on health sector reforms.
"Frames" are socio-cognitive structures through which we make sense of the world (Cornelissen and Werner 2014) . Thus, policy makers use frames to make sense of problems and their solutions (van Hulst and Yanow 2016) . In addition, frames are created and diffused through rhetorical strategies, which actors deploy to gain consensus about their policy (Barrett et al. 2013 ).
Policies are strategic resources used to drive change and are often thought to exercise hegemonic influence on societies and organizations (Brown 2004) . Our research stems from the assumption that competing frames can challenge the hegemony of a dominant frame generating contradictions in IS innovation. Policies are questioned and transformed not only as they are formulated but also as they become implemented (Motion and Leitch 2009; Mueller et al. 2004) . As policies are debated during implementation, new and competing frames about health service innovation emerge (Pope et al. 2006 ) and, potentially, replace the dominant frame thereby influencing policy transformation (Greener 2004) .
In order to explore the role of frames in policy transformation, we adopt frame theory and rhetorical strategies analysis in the case study of health information systems in Kenya. The case study takes a historical perspective to show how policy and organizational actors ! 4! deploy rhetorical strategies to persuade others about their own ideas of policy reforms and IS innovation in the health sector.
Our paper makes two contributions. First, we reveal the main rhetorical strategies challenging the hegemony of dominant frames, and explain how such strategies can generate contradictions that have an impact on IS innovation in healthcare (Currie 2012; Currie and Guah 2007; Klecun 2015; Klecun-Dabrowska and Cornford 2000; Morrison et al. 2013) . In this way, we can learn more about the nature and source of IS innovation contradictions, how they evolve and their implications for the design and implementation of IS innovation in healthcare. Second, we contribute to recent research about the role of technologies in influencing policy and IT-enabled transformation (Constantinides 2013; Doolin 2003; Klecun 2011) . Thus, our second contribution is to understand how technology mediates rhetorical strategies influencing changes in policy and the way IS innovations and possible contradictory outcomes unfold.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we talk about the effectiveness of rhetorical strategies in influencing policy transformation. In the section that follows we propose frame theory to understand the political function of rhetorical strategies and the role of technology in policy transformation and IS innovation in the health sector. Then we describe our methodology and we present a rhetorical strategies analysis of the case study.
Main findings and implications are then discussed followed by conclusions.
Rhetorical strategies and policy transformation
Policies constitute a major strategic resource through which policy-making organizations drive change in societal and economic systems, institutions and organizations (Leitch and Davenport 2005; Maguire and Hardy 2006; Motion and Leitch 2009 ). The key aim of policy makers is to impose a unique view of reality and suppressing differences. The suppression of differences is one way through which policy-makers seek to protect the authority of a ! 5!
policy. Yet, because "authority" is "ascribed to texts by their readers", the meanings of policies are not fixed but can be subject to contestation and re-interpretations (Brown 2004) .
Thus, whereas a policy is initiated by policy-making institutions, the legitimacy of "its associated truth" constitute the process by which stakeholder organizations may transform a policy (Motion and Leitch 2009 ). These organizations become authors of a policy and deploy their own knowledge and power to negotiate its meanings. Legitimacy of a new policy and the meaning and practice changes that it involves occurs only after the process of negotiation has been completed successfully.
Meanings of a policy can also be negotiated and transformed during implementation. The way transformed meanings are connected and disconnected generates a policyimplementation gap, which translates into differences in the implementation and adoption of health service innovations (Pope et al. 2006) . So the analysis of the linguistic turn in policy making and implementation explains, in part, why expectations of policy-makers are not met locally (Exworthy et al. 2002) .
One way in which organizational actors negotiate and transform policies is by deploying rhetorical strategies. Rhetorical strategies are mechanisms through which individuals shape their understanding of technologies, managerial practices and, more generally, the organizational context in which they are situated (Brown et al. 2012; Heracleous and Barrett 2001; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005) . In particular, with the help of rhetorical strategies, actors may appropriate only the meanings of a policy that best serve their own interests (Mueller et al. 2004 ).
In order to understand the influence of a policy on IS innovation in healthcare, a key point to take into consideration is the extent to which a rhetorical strategy is just ceremonial or does effectively affect change (Alvesson and Kärreman 2011) . A rhetorical strategy can have different functions resulting into more or less impact on the constitution of reality (Alvesson and Kärreman 2011) . Our aim is to understand the effectiveness of rhetorical strategies in ! 6! influencing the meaning negotiation and legitimization of health sector policies and IS innovation. In order to understand the effectiveness of rhetorical strategies, our focus will be on frames, the cognitive structures that actors shape and manifest through rhetorical strategies to make sense of and influence reality (Barrett et al. 2013 ).
Frames, power, and technology
Frames are socio-cognitive structures that we use to make sense of the world (Cornelissen and Werner 2014) . It is through these socio-cognitive structures or frames that policy makers make sense of problems and their possible solutions (van Hulst and Yanow 2016) . Frames used in policy making may also include "technology frames" (Orlikowski and Gash 1994) influencing how policy makers make sense of an information system and the way it should be implemented and used to innovate the health service.
A key issue from a frame perspective is to understand how incongruent frames evolve over
time and with what implications on innovation processes. For example, in the context of IS innovation, shifts in frames have been understood as causing divergent patterns of, and conflict over, IS development, implementations, and use (Azad and Faraj 2008; Barrett et al. 2013; Constantinides and Barrett 2014; Davidson 2006; Orlikowski and Gash 1994) . In particular, it is through rhetorical strategies that a new frame about a technology (Barrett et al. 2013 ) and policy issue (Jones and Exworthy 2015) may be developed, diffused and made legitimate within or across communities of actors. Thus, rhetorical strategies can produce intended change by influencing shifts in frames.
Through rhetorical strategies, frames become means through which actors consolidate their power position. We perceive power as the capability of groups of actors to transform and safeguard their interests by shaping meaning through discourse (Avgerou and McGrath 2007; Brown 1998; Buchanan and Dawson 2007; Currie and Brown 2003) . Thus, in the analysis of rhetorical strategies, power relationships play a relevant role in influencing shifts in frames (Jones and Exworthy 2015) . In particular, incongruent frames can reflect a ! 7! reconfiguration of interests and values altering the legitimacy and enactment of a policy (Pope et al. 2006) . So, when it comes to the political influence of a rhetorical strategy, policymaking can be seen as an arena of political contests where power exercises its influence by subtly shaping problems and their solutions.
By acknowledging the political function of rhetorical strategies, we also consider change as emerging from the mutual relationship between discursive and non-discursive elements, such as institutions and political interests (Alvesson and Kärreman 2011) . The focus on nondiscursive elements allows us to acquire a better understanding of the extent to which technology becomes embedded in policy and, simultaneously, shapes its content. Related to this issue is how technology becomes implicated in the construction of frames representing a policy (Constantinides 2013; Doolin 2003; Klecun 2011) . On the one hand, local institutions, rules, values systems, and interests influence the way IS innovations are represented in frames, constituted and diffused in action. On the other hand, frames are not only shaped and diffused through social interactions, such as human communication, but also through material artifacts, such as texts and technologies (Doolin 2003 ). This perspective not only considers how frames and their rhetorical strategies can shape IS innovation (Barrett et al. 2013 ) and the popularity of an IT concept that drives its diffusion (Wang 2009) ; IS innovations and the frames and rhetorical strategies that drive their diffusion can also influence how health service delivery is conceived in policy and in action (Klecun 2015; Mathar 2011) . In this way, existing technologies shape and sustain key policy ideas and future innovations (Klecun 2011; Raviola and Norbäck 2013 ). An example is how the information, rules, and resources embodied in information systems in health care provide "concrete representations" (Doolin 2003) of how accountability should be enacted (Doolin 2004; Madon et al. 2010; Noir and Walsham 2007) . Thus, information technology can be a source of representations actors draw upon to construct the frames inherent in rhetorical strategies. In this way, it can mediate how a policy becomes legitimated or contested.
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So in this paper we base our case study analysis on the concept of frames and rhetorical strategies to identify different assumptions and expectations in health sector policies and their implications for IS innovation in healthcare. We view rhetorical strategies as mechanisms that policy and organizational actors use to shape and diffuse frames of how the health sector should be reformed. We acknowledge the political function of rhetorical strategies which actors deploy to pursue their own interests. We also consider technology shaping frames, thus, mediating the rhetorical strategies driving policy transformation. More detail about the type of rhetorical strategies considered in our case study is provided in the next section.
Methodology

Research context
The research is based on a historical analysis of the development of information systems in the public healthcare sector in Kenya. The Kenyan context suits the purpose of our study since, like in many other developing countries, health information systems have been the target of institutional reforms meant to improve the planning and management capacity of the health sector for more than 30 years (Odhiambo-Otieno 2005) . The objectives of these reforms include the integration of health information systems (Kimaro and Sahay 2007; Saltman et al. 2007 ) in order to provide decision makers across all levels of the health sector (hospital managers, district health managers, senior health policy managers) with timely and accurate health data to improve the delivery of health services (Chilundo and Aanestad 2004; Madon et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2008 ). Yet, available studies in developing countries
show that goals of integration were rarely achieved (Kimaro and Sahay 2007; OdhiamboOtieno 2005) . By contrast, vertical and centralized health information systems were the norm in many countries and used by national governments and donor agencies to monitor and account for performance and health spending (Madon et al. 2010; Mekonnen and Sahay 2008; Noir and Walsham 2007) . Thus, given the historical perspective adopted, the case ! 9! study in Kenya constitutes an ideal setting to analyze how, over time, incongruent frames and competing rhetorical strategies influenced the integration of health information systems as part of the effort to innovate development interventions in the health sector in Kenya.
In addition, given the importance of power in rhetorical strategies, the case study in Kenya represents an ideal setting due to the presence of a variety of actors standing at different relational and power positions. Hence, like in many other developing countries, global managerialist reforms driving health service innovation are subject to continuous international political pressures (Hayes and Rajao 2011; Rajao and Hayes 2009 ). In such a context, understanding how competing frames and their rhetorical strategies influence policy formulation and implementation acquires even more significance.
Data collection
Data were collected from interviews and documents between 2007 and 2011. A total of fortyseven interviews were conducted as shown in Table 1 . 
Data analysis
We used rhetorical strategies analysis to understand how frames in policy are created, revisited and modified influencing IS innovation in healthcare. Our first step in the analysis was to read through our interview transcripts and document extracts several times in order to build a chronology of significant events that "speak about" relevant themes such as aideffectiveness, accountability, etc. "Chronology is the starting point of the narrative building of a plot that feeds the sensemaking process" (Boudes and Laroche 2009, p. 383) . Based on the presupposition that "texts are elements of social events; they bring about change" (Fairclough 2003) , chronology of events were pieced together by relating each event to key texts including both documents and interview transcripts.
At this stage we were able to identify key frames representing health care policies. For example, the frames of "health as a human right" or "social justice" were representative of Primary Health Care whereas "cost-effectiveness" and "accountability" constituted the policy of Selective Primary Health Care.
Hence, the next step of our analysis was to focus on rhetorical strategies as mechanisms through which actors seek to gain consensus over what makes sense to them. Drawing on Fairclough's (2003, pp. 41-42) typology we focused on four rhetorical strategies as illustrated in Table 2 . In Fairclough's words the five rhetorical strategies in Table 2 can be used to understand how actors interpret and negotiate differences in meaning. For example, openness to difference (a) assumes one's effort to understand and accept differences.
When conflict is accentuated through polemic (b), the acceptance of differences of power may prevail leading to consensus through the suppression of meanings (e). Rhetorical strategies (c) resolution and (d) bracketing of differences relate to a less conflictual and softer way of dealing with differences. In both rhetorical strategies prevails the mutual understanding that differences in meanings and values may coexist. For example, two actors may overcome differences (c) by proposing alternative points of view or solutions that mediate between opposite meanings. Alternatively, they may set aside differences and decide to focus on commonalities only (d). The case study analysis that follows revealed four of the strategies illustrated in Table 2 : polemic (b), resolution (c), bracketing (d), and normalization (e). In the analysis of these strategies, particular attention was given to the role of unbalanced power relations and misalignment and realignment of interests among different actors (Constantinides and Barrett 2006; Doolin 2004) . Table 2 . Rhetorical strategies* a) openness: acceptance and recognition of difference; b) polemic: an accentuation of difference and conflict, as struggle over meaning, norms, and power;
Case study and analysis
The case that follows focuses on the main rhetorical strategies that were used to create, recreate, and challenge three key policies in international health: Primary Health Care (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) ; Selective Primary Health Care (1979 Care ( -1994 ; Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) . The case study shows how the translation of international policies and their frames influenced health information systems in Kenya in five phases. In addition to the summary tables at the end of each phase, we provide more detail on how frames and their respective rhetorical strategies were identified from interviews and policy documents in the Appendix.
Phase 1: the creation of Primary Health Care (PHC) in the international health arena (1970-1978)
The failure of the global malaria eradication program in the 1960s prompted the WHO and members of the scientific community to deploy a polemic rhetorical strategy. Through this rhetorical strategy, they dismissed old models of delivering healthcare, such as vertical control programs. They acknowledged, instead, the strengthening of health infrastructures in developing countries as a more adequate approach to malaria control (Bennett 1979; Brown et al. 2006) . Based on new socio-economic theories of development and the views of human rights movements, they argued that a new approach, Primary Health Care (PHC), could support the integration of community-based health services (Brown et al. 2006; Gish 1982) .
Starting with a study of community-based rural health services carried out in 1971, subsequent policy and scientific texts molded the PHC concept over the principles that health is "a fundamental human right" and its attainability by all a matter of "social justice"
! 13! (WHO 1978) . Primary health care promoted "equity of distribution of health care" (Bennett 1979, p. 505) by focusing on the "basic health needs" of a community within "existing resource constraints" (Gish 1982 (Gish , p. 1050 .
PHC gained legitimacy from the international community at the Alma-Ata Conference, where, in 1978, 134 nations adopted the Declaration of Primary Health Care (Brown et al. 2006 ). The Declaration set the goal of "Health for all in the Year 2000" and promoted an "intersectoral" and systemic approach to "health care and health education" in developing countries (Brown et al. 2006; WHO 1978) . Table 3 summarizes the key findings of this period. organizations used the seminal work by Walsh and Warren (1979) to delegitimize PHC (Cueto 2004) as being "unrealistic" and "unattainable" (Brown et al. 2006, p. 67) . By contrast SPHC was considered as a better approach to achieve "cost-effectiveness" and rapid "Since it must be acknowledged that resources available for health programs are usually limited, the provision of total primary health care to everyone in the near future remains unlikely… services targeted to the few most important diseases may be the most effective means of improving the health of the greatest number of people" (Walsh and Warren 1980, p. 148) .
Major donor agencies approved SPHC because it legitimized institutionalized models of international aid like short-term development programs as the only option to attain rapid results in health interventions (Brown et al. 2006; Gish 1982; Walsh and Warren 1979) . This message can be read in the words attributed to the then executive director of UNICEF, James Grant:
"Grant believed that international agencies had to do their best with finite resources and shortlived local political opportunities. This meant translating general goals into time-bound specific actions" (Cueto 2004, p. 1869).
Thus, the scientists' rhetorical strategy was successful in gaining support to SPHC by major international organizations as demonstrated by the implementation of selective interventions such as the GOBI program (Cueto 2004 (Cueto 2004 (Cueto , p. 1871 .
On the other hand, the supporters of SPHC criticized the lack of clear targets in PHC. In order to reconcile these opposite views and win support to PHC, the WHO reviewed the PHC policy through a rhetorical strategy of bracketing differences; in a paper entitled "Indicators for Monitoring Progress Towards Health for All", the WHO proposed the use of indicators to monitor the implementation of "Health for All" strategies and plans, all concepts that were commonly accepted among PHC opponents (Brown et al. 2006) . Monitoring indicators were an important source of representation of how measurable targets could be used to gauge health interventions progress as spelled out in the SPHC policy. Thus, monitoring indicators and the frames that they represented were at the heart of the rhetorical strategy that the WHO deployed to create commonalities between PHC and SPHC. This is the example of how an IS innovation, such as the use of indicators in the monitoring and planning of health interventions, can shape health sector policies (Klecun 2015; Mathar 2011 ).
An attentive analysis of the "Health for All" strategy of 1979 unveiled a set of "technology frames" (Orlikowski and Gash 1994) . Through these frames the WHO re-interpreted the design and use of HIS monitoring indicators with a focus on community healthcare needs as advocated in PHC. The strategy recommended "developing locally suitable indicators", whereas "sampling" should be used in order to avoid "overloading health workers with routine data collection", "inaccurate reporting and unused information" (WHO 1979) . Against the top-down approach of disease control programs, the strategy proposed a bottom up approach to monitoring indicators to make them "manageable" and "meaningful" for the local populations (WHO 1979, p. 30) .
By adhering to SPHC principles, international organizations like UNICEF acquired legitimacy and access to donor funding, whereas the WHO lost its dominant position in international health to the advantage of the World Bank (Brown et al. 2006; Silver 1998) . Key findings are summarized in Table 4 . (NASCOP 1990) .
At the same time, the WHO's rhetorical strategy challenged the SPHC idea of short-term, ad-hoc health interventions by putting forward principles and concepts that were more in line with the comprehensive care values of PHC. Such principles and concepts included the integration of such interventions as immunization and the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, into the national and rural health systems of the country (Atun et al. 2008; WHA 1974) :
"The Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD) Control Program will not be a vertical program but will be decentralized and integrated with other programs based on… PHC principles…" (NASCOP 1990).
National health programs became an umbrella under which various donor agencies were funding targeted health interventions, which also led to the establishment of national agencies were interested in using information systems to account for vaccines supply and to plan and monitor ad-hoc initiatives such as polio immunization campaigns (Brown et al. 2006 ). An officer of the immunization program explained this during an interview:
"When we started the first national immunization day campaign for polio in 1996, we had to use a lot of this information to do the planning for the districts".
Yet, the lack of integration across national program information systems overburdened health workers at the health facilities with data collection duties to the extent that data reporting and processing were less efficient (Odhiambo-Otieno 2005). Before we go on to describe the next phase, where a new policy of integrated and coordinated health interventions emerged, we summarize the main findings of this period in Table 5 . Notwithstanding the government's effort to set up performance management and monitoring systems, these findings suggest that accountability was still not fully taken-for-granted within government's institutions. Many donor agencies interpreted poor accountability as a form of resistance to health sector reforms, which restrained them from fully committing to aidcoordination and the integration of health information systems. Official reports from the HMIS confirmed how disjointed data management procedures and practices embedded in vertical health information systems had not been resolved yet (Ministry of Health 2006) . At the same time, lack of coordination between different donor partners was still a problem as claimed by a donor agency consultant:
"[Most of the time the Global Fund, The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI), HMIS, and so on… are even trying to achieve the same objectives, but they are not
talking to each other in a structured manner". Table 6 provides a summary of key findings for this period. 
"Coordinate and supervise implementation of AIDS programs through a multisectoral, multidisciplinary approach… mobilize Government ministries and institutions, NGOs etc. to participate in AIDS control… develop management information systems for AIDS control" (Government of Kenya 1997).
NACC was created through the rhetorical strategy of resolving differences, similar to that 
"The reason why you have multiple AIDS control programs is that donors wanted to have more control over how the money was spent in that particular area. So they created new institutions of management… more fragmentation and duplication".
Thus, the lack of integration between various HIV/AIDS programs and their respective information systems was driven by donors' desire to secure political control over funded activities. As a result, the national program of HIV/AIDS became more accountable to NACC and other international donor organizations than the central health management information system of the Ministry of Health. With this regard, one information officer explained:
"[The national program of HIV/AIDS] has to report to NACC… UNAIDS… WHO, and even for further funding they need to keep the partners abreast of what is happening".
Hence, incongruent frames about the definition and conditions of international aid integration challenged the harmonization of health information systems and undermined aideffectiveness.
A further challenge to SWAps integration agenda came from national program information officers, who considered accountability as a source of opportunities to raise funds for their programs:
! 25! "In the beginning we really did not have many [donor] partners on board, but gradually they are coming in […] and demand for information has really gone up. […] Everybody is [now] very sensitive [about the need for information] to solicit funds.
These officers enacted a rhetorical strategy of normalization to enforce accountability on health workers collecting data at health facilities. Their rhetorical strategy was to persuade them that "documenting" drugs consumption was vital to access funding and carry on their activities:
"Issues of documentation have been problems among health workers… [We tell] them: 'I wouldn't give you drugs before you tell me what you spent on drugs… [You can use reported data to]… replenish whatever stock you need".
Thus, national program officers drew upon HIS outputs, such as data reports "documenting" results, in their rhetorical strategy to demonstrate how field workers should use the HIS to account for results. In this way, they gave continuity to the frame of accountability. The normalization of accountability contributed to the strong centralization of program information systems. As a result, health workers did not value the use of information to improve health service management and delivery within their communities. A summary of these findings is provided in Table 7 . and outcomes illustrated in the case study analysis above is provided in Table 8 . 
Discussion and implications
Large scale ICT innovation programs are the result of interdependencies between the macro policy level and the micro implementation level (Greenhalgh and Stones 2010; Pope et al. 2006) . The rhetorical strategies analysis adopted in this study has clarified the mechanisms through which policy-making and enactment intertwine. In particular, we contribute to a major understanding of the effectiveness of rhetorical strategies in influencing IS innovation in healthcare.
Our analysis above shows how some rhetorical strategies (e.g. normalization and polemic strategies), influenced by powerful actors, are more likely to set in place dominant frames with hegemonic influence (Brown 2004 ). For example, as shown in the second phase of the case study summarized in Table 4 , major international donor agencies displaced PHC with rhetorical strategies of normalization and polemic. In addition, national program officers extended the hegemonic influence of the dominant frame of accountability by adopting a rhetorical strategy of normalization (see phase 5 summarized in table 7). Thus, rhetorical strategies constitute an instrument of power (Barrett et al. 2013; Bartis and Mitev 2008; Jones and Exworthy 2015) , which international policy actors can exercise also with the help of less powerful actors at the local level.
We also reveal how the voice of the less powerful (Boje 2001) can challenge the hegemony of dominant frames. In various instances less powerful actors enacted less confrontational rhetorical strategies. For example, the WHO enacted the rhetorical strategy of bracketing differences to compromise between PHC and SPHC (see phases 2 and 3 summarized, respectively, in Tables 4 and 5 ). In phase 4 the Ministry of Health enacted the rhetorical strategy of resolving differences to support HIS integration and revert the fragmentation of ! 28! HIS (see summary in Table 6 ). The rhetorical strategies enacted by less powerful actors had different degrees of achievements in eroding the hegemony of dominant frames and, therefore, different effects on possible contradictions in IS innovation. In the discussion that follows we link the choice and effect of a rhetorical strategy to the set of interests and values upon which policy actors construct a frame. In particular, we argue that lack of coherence with the interests and values underlying competing frames can generate further contradictions in IS innovation. This was the case with the World Bank supporting two distinct policies based on the same principle of aid-effectiveness, yet to achieve different interests (see phases 4 and 5, summarized, respectively, in tables 6 and 7).
In addition, our findings complement existing research on the role of technology in influencing policy and innovation (Constantinides 2013; Doolin 2003; Klecun 2011 ) by demonstrating how technology contributes to shaping frames inherent in rhetorical strategies. In the discussion that follows we illustrate how elements of health information systems, such as monitoring indicators, constitute a source of representations actors draw upon to construct their frames and legitimize the use of HIS. Below, we provide a more detailed discussion of our findings, which are summarized in Table 9 . 
Actors' adherence to the interests and values underlying frames and its influence on IS innovation in healthcare
In this section we discuss how the choice of a rhetorical strategy and its consequences on IS innovation were influenced by the set of interests and values upon which frames were constructed. In particular, we base the discussion that follows on two main examples. The first example is about the WHO, a weak actor that tries to limit the hegemony of a dominant frame. The second example is about national program officers, again, weak actors, with the difference that their rhetorical strategy was supportive of the dominant frame of accountability.
Starting with the first example, as shown in the second and third phase of the case study (see summary in Tables 4 and 5) , the WHO adopted a rhetorical strategy of bracketing differences to integrate some of SPHC frames into its policy. By doing so, the WHO Thus, actors' reconfiguration of interests and values is reflected in the frames and rhetorical strategies that they adopt (Pope et al. 2006) . Another example is given by national health programs like HIV/AIDS, which, by becoming more accountable to their donors, assimilated dominant frames legitimizing accountability through a rhetorical strategy of normalization (see phase 5 summarized in Table 7 ). The rhetorical strategy of normalization represented a remissive acceptance of accountability to preserve access to donor funding and, therefore, protect their interests. National program officers adhered strongly to the interests underlying dominant frames of accountability. Thus, they contributed to suppressing differences with competing frames supporting aid-effectiveness and health information systems integration.
This second example shows that dominant frames of international policies can intensify and ! 31! extend their influence thanks to the support of local actors. Hence, the normalization of accountability by national programs contributed to the strong centralization of their health information systems. HIS centralization contradicted the need for local information ownership undermining health service management and delivery.
Past research has acknowledged that accountability interests of donor agencies are among the major sources of fragmentation of HIS in developing countries (Madon et al. 2010; Sahay et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2008) . Our findings suggest that contradictory outcomes of IS innovation cannot be simply associated with powerful actors seeking to establish the hegemony of dominant frames. Frames inherent in the rhetorical strategies of less powerful policy actors also matter and may have further controversial effects. In particular, the two examples above illustrate that the effect of rhetorical strategies depend on authors'
adherence to the interests and values upon which frames are constructed.
In the discussion that follows we illustrate the opposite case of two policy actors, one less powerful than the other. The rhetorical strategies of these two actors were not successful in affirming a new policy because their interests and values were not aligned with those underlying the frames carried in their rhetorical strategies. The impact on IS innovation contradictions will also be discussed.
The ambiguous political function of frames in policy transformation and IS innovation
An important contribution of the discussion that follows concerns how frames that are apparently supportive of a system of common values can be used to deliver different rhetorical strategies and, therefore, produce different effects in IS innovation. For example, as narrated in the fourth phase of the case study (see summary in Table 6 ), the Ministry of
Health enacted a rhetorical strategy of resolving differences to integrate health information systems. Together with Sector Wide Approaches (SWAps), the new policy of HIS integration was meant to reverse the fragmentation trend set by SPHC. In particular, it stressed the importance of HIS integration for better heath sector planning, performance monitoring and accountability. On the other hand, donor agencies considered poor accountability as a legitimate reason for limiting budget support envisaged in sector-wide approaches. Donor agencies defended the principle of accountability through a polemic rhetorical strategy. By doing so, they neutralized SWAps effect and, in particular, aid-effectiveness. Most of all, they challenged the integration of health programs and information systems.
Whereas, in the case of the Ministry of Health, the lack of accountability was a rhetorical device to formulate and legitimize integration policies, in the case of donor agencies, the lack of accountability was a rhetorical device to delegitimize such policies and limit integration where possible. Accountability assumed different legitimation roles according to the different meanings that it was given in practice. In the case of the national government, accountability was legitimized in its rhetorical strategy but not so much in practice. As pointed out in the data analysis above, the government's poor legitimacy of accountability is demonstrated by its lack of capacity and effort in setting up financial control systems. As opposed to the Ministry of Health, for donor agencies, accountability was an important institutional requirement to safeguard their interests. Thus, as some donor agencies perceived little commitment to accountability from the government side, they were reluctant to provide budget support and sponsor the integration of health interventions and information systems under the new policies (e.g. national health policy and SWAps).
Based on these findings, we can conclude that the Ministry of Health did not fully adhere to the accountability principles and practices underlying the frames of its new policy. As a result, the new policy of integration was unsuccessful in diminishing the effects of donors' dominant frames. Hence, initial attempts to integrate the HIS, including the integration of data collection forms, stood in contradiction with continuous donors' support to vertical HIS. Bank's rhetorical strategies. As illustrated in phase 4 and summarized in Table 6 , the World Bank used aid-effectiveness as a rhetorical device to defend its lending policies and practices and revert the fragmentation of health programs. The same principle of aideffectiveness was drawn upon to construct the frame legitimizing multisectoral coordination in HIV/AIDS. Yet, in this case, the principle of aid-effectiveness was part of a rhetorical strategy to legitimize the World Bank's power and control over HIV/AIDS interventions, an area that was attracting a lot of political and economic interests (see phase 5 summarized in Table 7 ). Thus, the rhetorical strategy of the World Bank supported a new frame of multisectoral coordination that contradicted the frame of sector-wide integration of the SWAps agenda. Hence, two frames that only appeared to have been constructed on the same principle ("aid-effectiveness") were meant, in reality, to preserve different political interests. The rhetorical strategy of resolving differences deployed by the World Bank was thus unsuccessful in gaining legitimacy of aid-effectiveness and HIS integration. The lack of success of this rhetorical strategy was reflected in the creation of multiple monitoring systems, which intensified contradictions with health interventions and information systems integration under SWAps.
Previous studies found how a rhetorical strategy may influence the legitimacy of an IS innovation, how it is adopted and diffused within a user community (Barrett et al. 2013; Kaganer et al. 2010) . Our findings add to these studies by demonstrating that the effectiveness of a rhetorical strategy needs to be understood not only in relation to its recipients, but also in relation to its authors. In addition to what previous studies suggested (Barrett et al. 2013) , our study found that actors may not always be coherent with the interests and values underlying the frames inherent in their own rhetorical strategies. This finding extends existing studies (Constantinides and Barrett 2014) upon the same principles. Yet, its purpose was to achieve misaligned interests, resulting into one policy damaging the other.
These findings unveil the complexity of the economic and political dimensions of discourse and their influence on IS innovations (Barrett et al. 2013) . In particular, they shift the attention to the ambiguous political function of frames by disconnecting the discursive justification for change and innovation from the interests that motivate them.
The role of technology in the context of rhetorical strategies
In the previous section we have illustrated how frames can influence the effectiveness of rhetorical strategies in relation to their alignment with actors' interests and values. In this section we discuss the role of technology in shaping frames to better understand its influence on policy enactments.
Previous research has acknowledged the role of IS innovations in influencing policy-making in the health sector (Klecun 2015; Mathar 2011 ). Yet, existing studies do not explicitly show how the material features of a technology influence policy transformation (Constantinides 2013; Doolin 2003; Klecun 2011; Raviola and Norbäck 2013) . In the discussion that follows we demonstrate how our study fills this gap. In particular, our argument is that technology constitutes a source of representations used by policy actors to construct frames, which are then diffused through rhetorical strategies. In this way technology contributes to policy transformation. We also argue that the resulting effects of technology on IS innovation ! 35! contradictions are linked to how actors relate their values and interests with the frames technology shapes and the consequent rhetorical strategies that they enact.
In this study, we consider the technology of a HIS as comprising such material components as monitoring indicators and systems, data reports, health information, etc. For example, as discussed in the second phase of the case study (see summary in Table 4 ), monitoring indicators were a source of representation of selective interventions as easy to measure and able to produce rapid results, namely, one of the key frames of SPHC.
Monitoring indicators and the SPHC frames that they represented were also integrated in the rhetorical strategy of bracketing differences that the WHO enacted in order to create commonalities between PHC and SPHC. In particular, as demonstrated in phase 3 summarized in Table 5 , monitoring tools, such as epidemiological and surveillance systems, were a source of representation of the use of managerial data to measure program performance.
The fourth phase of the case study (see summary in Table 6 ) shows how technology constraints contributed to the realization that HIS integration was needed for performance monitoring and accountability, which represented a key frame of their new policy. Likewise, in the last phase of the case study (see summary in Table 7 ) we show how national program officers drew upon data reports "documenting" results to demonstrate how field workers should use the HIS to account for results. In this way, they gave continuity to the frame of accountability legitimizing centralized reporting systems while undermining local ownership of information.
These examples demonstrate how technology constructs frames thereby mediating rhetorical strategies. Dominant frames of accountability legitimized the role of technology in enacting a policy (Klecun 2015 In addition, the persistence of technology-shaped frames may lead to little changes to actors' vision of how technology can innovate the health sector. For example, as shown in our case study, through its representations, the HIS gave continuity to the hegemonic frame of accountability legitimizing centralized reporting of health data to account for results. The resulting little usage of information by users at the point of delivery of health services stood in contradiction with the HIS function of supporting health service planning and management at the local level.
We acknowledge the role of existing technologies in performing future innovations (Raviola and Norbäck 2013) . We add that, by contributing to shaping dominant frames, existing technologies can constrain policy change and the development of new IS innovations that may come with it. This point is particularly important because we believe that existing research (Klecun 2015) tells us little about how competing frames can challenge dominant frames shaped by technologies thereby influencing technological change and IS innovation.
With the introduction of new innovative technologies, new frames should come into existence and be diffused triggering wider policy change.
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In summary, our findings provide insights into the influence of frames and rhetorical strategies on IS innovation and the role that different actors play in the policy enactments of IS innovation. We also increase the understanding of the role that technology plays in the policy enactment of IS innovation. 
Conclusion
In this paper we have provided a systematic understanding of the mechanisms through which policy creation and enactment affect IS innovation in the health sector. We adopted frame theory and rhetorical strategies analysis for a better understanding of the effectiveness of rhetorical strategies in challenging dominant frames and the resultant (Wagner 2003; Webb and Mallon 2007) and existing discursive approaches to IS innovation (Barrett et al. 2013; Constantinides 2013; Constantinides and Barrett 2014) .
By focusing on frames, we demonstrated how the "insidious" political influence (Jones and Exworthy 2015) of rhetorical strategies on IS innovation (Barrett et al. 2013 ) is exercised by disconnecting the discursive justification for an innovation from the interests that motivate it.
Thus, the way an IS innovation unfolds and produces its effects is only in part driven by dominant frames (Barrett et al. 2013 ) and the popularity of innovation concepts (Wang 2009 ). The power-balance between actors and how actors relate their interests and values with frames are two important factors determining which rhetorical strategies are used and their role in diffusing and establishing frames that influence IS innovations (Barrett et al. 2013; Bartis and Mitev 2008; Jones and Exworthy 2015) .
We also contribute towards a better understanding of the role of information technology in shaping policy and IS innovation (Constantinides 2013; Doolin 2003; Raviola and Norbäck 2013) . In particular, this study highlights the role of technology in shaping dominant frames.
The way in which actors relate their interests and values with technology-shaped frames is important to understand the implications of technology for policy transformation and healthcare IS innovation. We also demonstrate the implications of the materiality of a technology in giving continuity to a dominant frame, thereby, limiting policy change and further IS innovation.
We acknowledge the limitations of the focus on one type of technology such as health information systems in the specific context of Kenya. Such limitations concern the implications of our findings for understanding the role of other types of technology in shaping health sector policies in other contexts. This notwithstanding, our key contribution is to ! 39! demonstrate how rhetorical strategy analysis can be used to better understand the implications of policy transformation for IS innovation.
Our theoretical contribution represented in Figure 2 and the methodological approach that we develop in this paper could serve as a basis for future research to further our understanding of how different types of technology (e.g. Electronic Health Records Systems, telehealth, mobile health, etc.) shape policy and lead to new trajectories of action in IS innovation. Past research found how IT concepts driving the diffusion of IS innovations become taken-for-granted and acquire legitimacy (Wang 2009 ). It is also important to understand how IT concepts translate into policy influencing IS innovations and their institutionalization at a large scale. The applicability of a discursive approach to the analysis of how technology performs policy is not restricted to IT-enabled transformation in healthcare and the wider public sector. A rhetorical strategy analysis could benefit research focusing on how technology standards (Backhouse et al. 2006 ) are developed and shape technology and innovation policies.
